Michael O. Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corporation, dba and fka Terracor; the City of St. George, a municipal corporation; Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer of the State of Utah : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Michael O. Longley v. Leucadia Financial
Corporation, dba and fka Terracor; the City of St.
George, a municipal corporation; Robert L.
Morgan, State Engineer of the State of Utah : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Skeen; Bryon J. Benevento; Thomas W. Clawson; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy; Attorneys for Leucadia Financial Corp; Gary G. Kuhlmann; Attorney for City of St.
George; Michael M. Quealy; John H. Mabey, Jr.; Assistant Attorneys General; Attorney for State
Engineer.
J. Craig Smith; David B. Hartvigsen; Annette F. Sorensen; Nielsen & Senior; Attorneys for Michael
Longley.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corporation, No. 970152 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/729




IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS crT 
^g— 
MICHAEL O. LONGLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba and fka TERRACOR; the CITY OF ST. 
GEORGE, a municipal corporation; and 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
CKET NO. 
Case No. 970152-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE, JUDGE. 
J. Craig Smith, No. 4143 
David B. Hartvigsen, No. 5390 
Annette F. Sorensen, No. 6989 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Gary G. Kuhlmann, No. 
City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801)634-5800 
Attorney for Appellee 
City of St. George 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
PUBLISHED OPINION 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 2 1997 
Jan Graham, No. 1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Michael M. Quealy, No. 2667 
John H. Mabey, Jr., No. 4625 
Assistant Attorneys General 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Box 140855 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0855 
Telephone: (801)538-7227 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer 
V A N C O T T , B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L 
& M C C A R T H Y 
Richard C. Skeen, No. 2971 
Byron J. Benevento, No. 5254 
Thomas W. Clawson, No. 5679 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: (801)532-3333 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Leucadia Financial Corporation 
Julia WMmmtiro 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL O. LONGLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba and fka TERRACOR; the CITY OF ST. 
GEORGE, a municipal corporation; and 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 970152-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE, JUDGE. 
J. Craig Smith, No. 4143 
David B. Hartvigsen, No. 5390 
Annette F. Sorensen, No. 6989 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1900 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Gary G. Kuhlmann, No. 
City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801)634-5800 
Attorney for Appellee 
City of St. George 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
Jan Graham, No. 1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Michael M. Quealy, No. 2667 
John H. Mabey, Jr., No. 4625 
Assistant Attorneys General 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Box 140855 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0855 
Telephone: (801)538-7227 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Richard C. Skeen, No. 2971 
Byron J. Benevento, No. 5254 
Thomas W. Clawson, No. 5679 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Leucadia Financial Corporation 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
Nature of the Case 3 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 3 
Informal Adjudicative Proceeding Before the State Engineer 3 
Trial De Novo Before the District Court 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
LONGLEY'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE LONGLEY LACKED STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF THE STATE ENGINEER'S DECISION 10 
II. THE PUBLISHED NOTICE OF LEUCADIA'S EXTENSION REQUEST WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ADEQUATE IN AN INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING IN WHICH NO PROPERTY 
INTEREST OF LONGLEY WAS AT RISK OF BEING DEPRIVED OR ADVERSELY AFFECTED 13 
A. Longley's Water Rights Were Not At Risk of Being Deprived, Nor Were They Adversely Affected 
by the State Engineer in Leucadia's Extension Request Proceeding 14 
1. Utah's Water Administration Statutes and Policies Demonstrate that Other Water Rights Are Not at Risk 
of Being Deprived or Adversely Affected in an Extension Request Proceeding 15 
2. Utah Case Law Demonstrates that Other Water Rights Are Not at Risk of Being Deprived or Adversely 
Affected in an Extension Request Proceeding 19 
3. The Notice by Publication of Leucadia's Extension Request Was Constitutionally Adequate 21 
B. Longley's Desire to Protect and Defend His Water Rights in Leucadia's Extension Request Proceeding Is 
Not A Protected Property Interest 21 
1. A Cause of Action to Protect and Defend Water Rights Does Not Exist in an Extension Request 
Proceeding 22 
i 
2. The Determination of Whether the Approval of an Extension Request Will Adversely Affect Other 
Water Rights is Not an Issue in an Extension Request Proceeding and the State Engineer and the District 
Court on De Novo Review Has No Authority to Consider the Issue 23 
C. Longley Did Not Have a "Constitutional Right to Protest." 26 
D. Simply Because Longley Raised Various Claims and Requested "Notice of Any Further Action" Did Not 
Entitle Longley to Actual Notice 28 
III. THE APRIL 1994 PUBLISHED NOTICE COMPLIED WITH UTAH LAW 30 
A. The Published Notice Strictly Complied with the Statutory Requirements 31 
1. The State Engineer's Jurisdiction is Limited under the Extension Request Statute and the Notice Provision 
is Consistent with that Limited Jurisdiction 32 
2. The April 1994 Notice Contained All of the Elements Required by the Extension Request Statute 34 
a. The April 1994 notice provided information that informed the public of the diligence claimed 35 
b. The April 1994 notice provided the reason for the Extension Request 36 
c. The April 1994 notice correctly located each of the proposed wells 38 
B. Strict Compliance with the Notice Provision is not Required 41 
CONCLUSION 42 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 43 
ADDENDUM 45 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
h 
Cases 
49th Street Galleria v. Tax Comm 'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct. App, 1993) 
Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) 
Badgerv. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 750-51 (Utah 1996) 23, 24, 27, 32 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 351 (Utah 1996).... 
Bonhamv. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989) 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) - ; 
Craftsv. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983) 
Daniels Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 571 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1977) 20 
Department of Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1983) j 
Eardleyv. Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 365, 366 (Utah 1938) ,c>. T .2U24 -
Eldorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Cook, 822 P.2d 672 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) .. i 
Grayv. Department of Employment Security, 861 P.2d 807, 816 (Utah 1984) 
Harmonv. Ogden City Civil Service Comm% 917P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah 1996). _ 
Harper Investments, Inc. v. A uditing Div., 868 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Utah 1994) .. '8 
Horton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
Magnesium Corp. of America v. Air Quality £rf., 941P.2d 653,659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) * 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,^335 (1976) 4 
Matter of Estate v. Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991) 
Patrickv. Rice, 814 P.2d 463, 467 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 815 P. 2ti io ( N \ l . N l ) | i : 
Pierceyv. Civil Service Comm fn 208 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1949) ;2 
Rocky? Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108. I 13 (Utah 1943)... : 
Ruppv. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) 
S&G Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1990) 
Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass *«., 270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1954) ^ 
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) J 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
Tulsa Professional Collection Service, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1c'NX .- .2 
V-1 Oil Company v. Dept. OfEnvironmental Quality, 317 Utah Adv. l<pt 11. P fl't. Sup. Ct. 1997)...... 14 !S 
Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1969).. 
Westv. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-07 (Utah 1994) * 
Whitmerv. City ofLindon, 322 Utah Adv. Rep 43, 44 (Ut Sup.. Ct. 1997) 2. 13. u> 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750, 751 (Utah 1944) 20. 2!. U) 
Worall v. Ogden City Fire Dept,, 616 P.2d 598 (1 Jtah 1980) 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) '.......'..... ' • 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 .28 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(a) .... 3 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-12 28. 2^ 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-12(1) •: 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(1 )(d) ... ; 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e) 23. \ i 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(1 )(a) 10. i 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 h 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 ;s. ,c> 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 2. 16 r 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12( I).. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7— ^ 
in 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-13 27 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14(1 )(a) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-12, -16 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1995) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a) (Supp. 1995) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(f) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989) 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(a) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(b) (1989) 21, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-10, -16 16 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-12(l)(b), -(g), -(h)(1), -<j) (1989) 24 
Utah Code Ann. §§73-3-3,-8(1989) 32 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1989) 24 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-12(1 )(b) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(d) (1989) 33 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e) 12, 17 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-12(1 )(e)(i), -(ii) (1989) 31 
UtahCodeAnn.§73-3-12(l)(e)(ii)(1989) 34,36 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (l)(f) 17 
UtahCodeAnn.§73-3-12(l)(g)(1989) 17,32 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(2) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1989) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a) (1989) 10 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-18(1989) 6, 17 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(f), -0) (1996) 1 
Other Authorities 
New York Public Library Writer's Guide to Style and Usage255 (1994) 39 
The Chicago Manual of Style 173(14th ed. 1993) 38 
Rules 
Division Rule R655-6-17 (1992) 28 
Utah Admin Code Rule R655-6-18(A) (1995) 11 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R655-6-2 (1995) 11 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R655-6-3(F) 12 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const., amend V 13 
Utah Const., art. 1, Sec. 7 13 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL O. LONGLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba and fka TERRACOR; the CITY OF ST. 
GEORGE, a municipal corporation; and 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is from the Summary Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court entered 
November 8, 1996, in a matter involving the review of a memorandum decision of the State Engineer. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(f), 
-(j) (1996). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has 
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the April 1994 published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request was adequate 
notice in an informal administrative proceeding before the State Engineer, which proceeding did not 
involve any property interest of Longley, and which, therefore, could not present any risk of adversely 
1 
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Priority No. 15 
affecting any of Longley's property interests? 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue presents questions of law. The Court therefore 
reviews the trial court's conclusions for correctness. State v Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
While considering the constitutionality of a statute, the Court resolves doubts in favor of 
constitutionality. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). 
Moreover, where Longley bases his claims on both the United States and Utah Constitutions, because 
the Court can decide this case under the Utah Constitution, the Court need not reach questions of 
federal constitutional law. Whitmer v. City ofLindon, 322 Utah Adv. Rptr. 43, 44 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
1997). 
2. Whether the April 1994 notice of Leucadia's Extension Request complied with the 
requirements of Section 73-3-12(1) of the Utah Code? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The adequacy of notice is a question of law, including 
whether the determination depends upon the interpretation of the written content of the published 
notice. Patrick v. Rice, 814 P.2d 463, 467 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 161 (N.M. 
1991). Therefore, the Court grants no deference to the district court's conclusions of law and reviews 
them for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1357 (Utah 1993) (whether trial court correctly interprets statute is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The full text is found in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 (1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1989). (Section 73-3-12 was amended in 1995 and 1997. However, the 
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governing statute for this case is found in Utah Code Ann., Vol. 7 C (1989 Replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Michael O. Longley ("Longley") appeals from the district court's Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered November 8, 1996 (the "District Court's Order"). 
(For a copy of the District Court's Order, see Addendum at A-1.) Longley sought de novo review by 
the district court of the State Engineer's June 19, 1995 Memorandum Decision (the "State Engineer's 
Decision") approving Leucadia's request for extension of time to file its proof of permanent change 
under a change application approved by the State Engineer in 1971. The district court granted 
summary judgment dismissing Longley's Second Amended Complaint on the basis that Longley did 
not have standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's Decision. The district court found 
that Longley did not timely protest Leucadia's extension request, and therefore, failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies pursuant to Sections 73-3-14(1 )(a) and 63-46b-14(2)(a) of the Utah Code. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Informal Adjudicative Proceeding Before the State Engineer 
Prior to their sale to the City of St. George in 1995, Leucadia was the owner of certain water 
rights located in Washington County, Utah. Leucadia also was the applicant on a change application 
filed in 1970 (Change Application No. 81-670 (a6393), which included water rights under two 
previously approved applications) (the "1970 Change Application"). The 1970 Change Application 
was approved by the State Engineer in 1971 and the proof was initially due on November 30, 1973. 
Between 1973 and 1990, Leucadia filed several Requests for Reinstatement and Extension of Time 
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with the State Engineer for the 1970 Change Application. All of these extension requests were granted 
by the State Engineer, including the fifth extension request at issue in this appeal. 
In connection with the processing of Leucadia's fifth extension request, the State Engineer 
published, in accordance with statute, notice of the extension request six times in a local newspaper of 
Washington County; three times in February 1994 and three times in April 1994. The April notices 
stated that written protests of Leucadia's extension request had to be filed with the State Engineer on or 
before May 14, 1994. Longley did not file a written protest on or before May 14, 1994. Longley 
claims to have filed a protest on or about April 3, 1995, fully ten months after such protests were to be 
filed in accordance with the published notice. 
The State Engineer approved Leucadia's fifth extension request. Longley then filed a request 
for reconsideration, which the State Engineer denied because only parties to a proceeding before the 
State Engineer may seek reconsideration of a decision by the State Engineer. Longley was not a party 
to the proceeding, having filed an untimely protest. 
Trial De Novo Before the District Court 
On August 18, 1995, sixty days after the State Engineer's Decision was issued, Longley filed 
his complaint with the district court seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's Decision. 
Appellees herein subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Longley's 
Second Amended Complaint on the basis that Longley lacked standing to seek de novo review of the 
State Engineer's Decision because Longley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 
law. Longley opposed the motion for summary judgment, in part, on the grounds that the published 
notice was defective, and therefore, the State Engineer's Decision was void. The district court granted 
Appellees' motion for summary judgment and found: 
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1. On April 1, 7 and 14, 1994, the State Engineer published notice of 
Leucadia's Extension Request in the Daily Spectrum newspaper in Washington County, 
Utah; 
2. The published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request contained 
information that informed the public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the 
request; 
3. The published notice of Leucadia's Extension request described the 
water rights at issue with sufficient detail; 
4. Plaintiff concedes that he did not file a protest with the State Engineer 
within thirty (30) days of the published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request. 
The district court then concluded: 
1. The State Engineer's notice [by] publication of Leucadia's Extension 
Request was sufficient to comply with Utah law; 
4. Plaintiff lacks standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's 
decision approving Leucadia's Extension Request because he did not file a timely 
protest, and therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1993). 
Following the entry of the District Court's Order, Longley filed his Notice of Appeal with the 
Utah Supreme Court, which transferred jurisdiction of this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. With respect to Leucadia's 1970 Change Application, on or about September 21,1990, 
Leucadia filed with the State Engineer its request to withdraw its proof of permanent change filed on 
November 30, 1989. (R. 163,184.) At the same time, Leucadia also filed its fifth Request for 
Reinstatement and Extension of Time (the "Extension Requesf) under the 1970 Change Application. (R. 
158,163,180,184,271,293.) 
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2. On July 10,1992, after Leucadia filed the Extension Request, the State Engineer issued a 
Memorandum Decision which states: 
It is . . . ORDERED and the Proof of Permanent Change submitted under [the 1970 
Change Application] 81-670 (a6393) which included certificated Water Right Number 
81-669 (A36856 Certificate Number 8627) and Application to Appropriate Number 81-
670 (A36857) is hereby REJECTED and [the 1970] Change Application Number 81-670 
(a6393) and Application to Appropriate Number 81-670 (A36857) are hereby LAPSED 
for failure to comply with statutory requirements and place the water to beneficial use. 
(R.49, 163,184,272.) 
3. On July 30,1992, Leucadia timely filed a request for reconsideration of the State 
Engineer's July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision. On August 20, 1992, the State Engineer granted 
Leucadia's request for reconsideration. (R. 54, 164,185,272.) 
4. On January 31,1994, the State Engineer issued an Amended Memorandum Decision, 
which states: 
It is . . . ORDERED and the rejection of the proof for [the 1970] Change 
Application Number 81-670 (a6393) which included Application to Appropriate 
Number 81-670 (A36857) and Certificated water right Number 81-669 (A36856) 
and the lapsing of Change Application Number 81-670 (a6393) and Application to 
Appropriate Number 81-670 (A36857) according to the July 10, 1992, 
Memorandum Decision are hereby RESCINDED and the applications are 
REINSTATED. The priority of the applications has been adjusted to reflect the 
filing date of the extension of time request filed September 21, 1990, and the 
extension request will be processed according to statutory requirements. 
(R. 58, 165,186,272-73.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18(1989), the State Engineer may 
reinstate applications upon a showing of reasonable cause. 
5. On February 3,10, and 17,1994, and again on April 1, 7, and 14, 1994, the State Engineer 
published notice ofthe Extension Request in The Daily Spectrum newspaper in Washington County, 
Utah. (R. 61, 273,287,289,290.) The April 1994 notices state that protests ofthe Extension Request 
must be filed with the State Engineer on or before May 14,1994. (R. 273,287,290.) 
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6. Longley did not file a protest to the Extension Request on or before May 14,1994. (R. 
166,187,273,287,330,354.) 
7. On June 19,1995, the State Engineer issued a Memorandum Decision granting the 
Extension Request. (R. 85,166,187,273.) 
8. On or about July 10, 1995, Longley filed a Request for Reconsideration of the State 
Engineer's June 19,1995 Memorandum Decision. (R. 100,167,273.) Longley's Request for 
Reconsideration does not allege defective notice or make reference to the alleged April 3, 1995 protest 
letter. (R. 100-107,273-74.) 
9. On July 19,1995, the State Engineer sent a letter to Longley stating that Longley is not 
entitled to request reconsideration of the June 19, 1995 Memorandum Decision because Longley was not 
a party to the administrative proceeding. (R. 112,188,274.) 
10. Leucadia sold and conveyed the subject Water Rights to the City of St. George in July, 
1995. (R. 158,180,274.) 
Solely for the purposes of summary judgment the following facts may be assumed: 
11. In or around October or November 1989, Longley contacted the State Engineer's office in 
an attempt to intervene in the administrative proceedings before the State Engineer regarding Leucadia's 
water rights. (R. 353.) Longley was informed that intervention is not allowed in informal administrative 
proceedings. (R. 353. See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(g)( 1995).) Longley also requested to be 
given notice of any further action on the matter. (R. 353-54.) 
12. On or about April 3, 1995, Longley filed the alleged protest letter with the State Engineer. 
(R. 354.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Longley's complaint because 
Longley lacked standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's Decision. Longley did not file 
a timely protest to Leucadia's Extension Request, and therefore, Longley was not a party to the 
administrative proceeding. Under Utah law, only parties who have participated in administrative 
proceedings are entitled to seek judicial review. By failing to file a protest with the State Engineer in a 
timely manner, Longley did not comply with the statutes and regulations governing administrative 
proceedings before the State Engineer. Participation in such proceedings is a condition precedent to 
seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's orders. By failing to satisfy the statutory condition 
precedent, Longley lacked standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's Decision by the 
district court. 
Longley argues that his due process rights were violated because he requested and was not 
given actual notice of the Extension Request proceeding and that the published notice was inadequate. 
Longley's due process arguments are fundamentally flawed. A person is denied due process if a state 
action deprives that person of a constitutionally protected property interest. None of Longley's 
property interests, however, were at risk of being deprived or adversely affected in Leucadia's 
Extension Request proceeding. 
Longley asserts that he owns water rights, which are a protected property interest. But in the 
administrative proceeding at hand, the State Engineer's action on Leucadia's Extension Request did 
not, and could not, deprive Longley his property interests in those water rights. Only Leucadia's water 
rights were at issue. Longley's water rights were not within the subject matter of the Extension 
Request proceeding and could not be adjudicated or adversely affected in any manner. Therefore, 
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Longley could not be deprived of his property interests by the State Engineer's grant or denial of 
Leucadia's Extension Request. In addition, Longley was not entitled to "actual notice by request" as a 
matter of constitutional law, statute, or regulation. 
Longley also argues that "his cause of action to defend" his water rights in an extension request 
proceeding is a protected property interest. But such a "cause of action to defend" does not exist 
because, again, Longley's rights were not threatened or adjudicated in Leucadia's Extension Request 
proceeding. There was nothing for Longley to protect or defend against. 
Finally, Longley argues that he was denied his "constitutional right to protest" and assert claims 
against Leucadia's Extension Request because Longley's water rights could be adversely affected. 
Again, as a matter of law, Longley's water rights could not be adversely affected in Leucadia's 
Extension Request proceeding. Furthermore, a right to protest an extension request is not a 
constitutionally protected property interest, but rather an opportunity afforded to the public to provide 
its concerns and viewpoints to the State Engineer as he determines whether a previously approved 
water right application or change application should be extended or lapsed. 
The April 1994 notice fully complied with Utah law. The notice was published for three 
successive weeks in an appropriate newspaper. The notice correctly identified the nature of the 
proceedings and the water rights at issue. The notice informed the public of the diligence claimed and 
the reason for the request. The notice also correctly described the locations of the proposed additional 
points of diversion under the 1970 Change Application. 
The notice provision in the extension request statute is consistent with the limited jurisdiction 
of the State Engineer under the statute. The notice provision is designed to provide general public 
notice of a pending extension request. As the State Engineer is the intended "protected party" under 
the notice provision, the notice provision is designed to ensure that the State Engineer is fully informed 
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in an extension request proceeding. Although the April 1994 notice strictly complied with the notice 
provision requirements, because the notice provision is designed to protect the State Engineer, not 
Longley, the April 1994 notice would have been adequate had it only substantially complied with the 
statutory notice provision requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING LONGLEY'S COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE LONGLEY LACKED STANDING TO SEEK 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE STATE ENGINEER'S DECISION. 
The basic issue before this Court is whether the district court properly granted summary 
judgment dismissing Longley's Second Amended Complaint. The complaint was dismissed because 
Longley lacked standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's decision. (R. 536.) 
Apparently, Longley has abandoned his standing claims on appeal, because he does not raise the issue 
in his brief. Except for a single assertion buried in an extended footnote at the end of his brief, 
Longley has not repeated the arguments regarding his right to seek judicial review based on his status 
as an "aggrieved person" or "aggrieved party." (See e.g., R. 345-49.) The district court's grant of 
summary judgment was proper, however, precisely because Longley was neither an aggrieved person 
nor an aggrieved party. 
Longley did not file a timely protest to Leucadia's Extension Request. (R. 166, 187, 273, 287, 
330, 354.) Therefore, Longley was not a party to the administrative proceedings. Only parties (or 
persons) who have participated in administrative proceedings are entitled to seek judicial review. 
Section 73-3-14(l)(a) of the Utah Code provides: 
Any person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial 
review by following the procedures and requirements of Chaptr 46b Title 63 [of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act]. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). Under this statute, judicial review is 
conditioned on compliance with the procedures and requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA"). Likewise, the rules of the Division of Water Rights (the "Division") also 
condition eligibility to seek judicial review of an order of the State Engineer upon complying with the 
procedures and requirements of UAPA. Those rules provide: 
Any party aggrieved by an order of the State Engineer may obtain judicial review by 
following the procedures and requirements of Section 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15 [of 
UAPA] and 73-3-14 and 73-3-15. 
Utah Admin Code Rule R655-6-18(A) (1995) (emphasis added). Clearly, judicial review is only 
available if the "person" (under the statute) or "party" (under the rule) follows the procedures and 
requirements of UAPA. The procedures and requirements of UAPA, however, further limit eligibility 
to seek judicial review. Under UAPA, only parties may seek judicial review of the State Engineer's 
decisions. The UAPA provides: 
A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1995) (emphasis added).1 UAPA further provides that "party" 
includes "all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(f). There is no statute that unconditionally authorizes 
Longley to participate as a party in the proceedings before the State Engineer. See e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a) (conditioning the right to seek judicial review of a State Engineer decision on 
compliance with the procedures and requirements of UAPA). The Division rules, however, provide 
that "protestants" are authorized to participate as "parties" in proceedings before the State Engineer. 
'Section 63-46b-15 of UAPA governs judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings. All proceedings 
before the Division of Water Rights and the State Engineer, including change applications and requests for reinstatement 
and extension of time, are separate informal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-2 (1995). 
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See Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-3(F). The Division's rules provide that protestants are only those 
interested persons who file their protest with the State Engineer on a timely basis, i.e., within 30 days 
after notice of an application or extension request is published. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e). 
Longley is not authorized under statute or the Division's rules to participate in the State 
Engineer's proceedings as a "party." Longley is not a "protestant" under the Division's rules because 
Longley did not timely protest Leucadia's Extension Request. Even if it is assumed arguendo, that 
Longley filed the alleged April 3, 1995 protest letter with the Division, he still is not a "protestant."2 In 
that case, Longley still would have been more than 10 months late in protesting the Extension Request. 
Under Section 73-3-12(l)(f) of the Utah Code, Longley was required to file a written protest of the 
Extension Request within 30 days after the notice of the Extension Request was published. To be 
timely, Longley's protest had to be filed by May 14, 1994. (R. 273, 287, 290.) Because Longley 
concedes that he did not file his protest until April 1995, at the earliest, (R. 166, 187, 273, 287, 350, 
354) clearly such a protest was untimely. 
By failing to file his protest with the State Engineer in a timely manner, Longley did not 
comply with the statutes and regulations governing administrative proceedings before the State 
Engineer. Participation in the administrative proceedings before the State Engineer is a condition 
precedent to seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's orders. S&G Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Utah 1990). By failing to satisfy the statutory condition precedent, Longley lacked 
standing to seek judicial review by the district court of the State Engineer's June 19, 1995 
Memorandum Decision. 
2
 Assuming for purposes of summary judgment the veracity of Longley's claims regarding the April 3, 1995 
protest letter, there are no disputed material facts that are relevant to the district court's conclusion that Longley lacked 
standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's decision. 
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II. THE PUBLISHED NOTICE OF LEUCADIA'S EXTENSION 
REQUEST WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE IN AN 
INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING IN WHICH NO 
PROPERTY INTEREST OF LONGLEY WAS AT RJSK OF 
BEING DEPRIVED OR ADVERSELY AFFECTED. 
The plain meaning of the due process clauses of both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
is that a person is afforded due process if that person is to be deprived of property. "No person shall. . 
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const., amend V. "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const., art. 1, 
Sec. 7. Longley's due process argument fails because no substantive interest of Longley was at risk of 
being deprived or adversely affected in Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding.3 
The prerequisites to the application of due process property protections are state action and a 
constitutionally protected property interest. Gray v. Department of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 
807, 816 (Utah 1984). As the United States Supreme Court has observed, it must first be "determined 
that the Due Process Clause applies," then "the question remains what process is due." Cleveland 
Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). This appeal involves the State Engineer 
taking action on Leucadia's Extension Request. In the Extension Request administrative proceeding, 
the rights of Leucadia under the previously approved 1970 Change Application were subject to being 
lapsed and were at risk. None of Longley's substantive interests were involved or at risk in the 
administrative proceeding. 
Despite the lack of a substantive property interest at risk in the proceeding, Longley 
erroneously contends that due process required the State Engineer to provide him actual notice of 
3
 In analyzing a due process challenge based on both the United States and Utah Constitutions, this Court may 
decide the case under the Utah Constitution and need not reach questions of federal constitutional law. Whitmer v. City of 
Lindon, 322 Utah Adv. Rep 43, 44 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1997). See also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-07 
(Utah 1994). Since this Court can decide this case under the Utah Constitution, this brief principally addresses Utah law. 
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Leucadia's Extension Request. Longley's contention totally fails under the analysis recently adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. To determine the procedural requirements of due process in any given 
context, three factors are balanced: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
V-l Oil Company v. Dept. Of Environmental Quality, 317 Utah Adv. Rpt. 11,13 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1997) 
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). Also of significance is whether the nature 
of the proceeding is administrative or judicial. Id. 
In this case we clearly have an administrative proceeding involving Leucadia's Extension 
Request; the private interest that will be affected is Leucadia's. No property interest of Longley will be 
affected or is even at "risk of an erroneous deprivation." The State Engineer's required determination 
in Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding does not adjudicate and could not adversely affect 
Longley's water rights. Furthermore, the "notice by request" procedural requirement promoted by 
Longley would be detrimental to a stable water rights system and unreasonably burdensome for the 
State Engineer who administers approximately 120,000 water rights in the State of Utah. (R. 390.) 
A. Longley's Water Rights Were Not At Risk of Being Deprived, Nor 
Were They Adversely Affected by the State Engineer in Leucadia's 
Extension Request Proceeding. 
Longley contends his vested water rights are protected property interests. As a matter of law, 
however, other water rights such as Longley's water rights, are not at risk of being deprived or 
adversely affected in an extension request proceeding. Accordingly, Longley is fundamentally unable 
to demonstrate how his rights are at risk or adversely affected by the State Engineer's action in 
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Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding. 
1. Utah's Water Administration Statutes and Policies Demonstrate 
that Other Water Rights Are Not at Risk of Being Deprived or 
Adversely Affected in an Extension Request Proceeding. 
The statutes and policies of this State, which are based on the prior appropriation doctrine, 
demonstrate that the water rights of other persons are not at risk or adversely affected in an extension 
request proceeding. The purpose of an extension request proceeding is to carry out state water policy, 
not to determine the water rights of the parties. 
Beginning in 1903 for surface waters and 1935 for groundwater, an application to appropriate 
water is first filed with the State Engineer to obtain a water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989). 
However, the mere filing of the application does not give the applicant the right to use water. Among 
other procedures required by statute, notice of the application must be published in an appropriate 
newspaper. The State Engineer may then take action on the application pursuant to the criteria of 
Section 73-3-8 of the Utah Code. State Engineer approval of the application, however, is only a 
preliminary step and simply gives the applicant the authority to proceed and perfect, if possible, the 
proposed appropriation by actually diverting the water and applying it to a beneficial use. Rocky Ford 
Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 113 (Utah 1943). 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, all applications are approved subject to the water rights 
of prior appropriators. The rights of prior appropriators are not harmed of affected in any way. As 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in 1938: 
Any application that is filed is subject to all prior rights which have accrued 
prior to such filing. Filing the application does not give the applicant the right or 
license to proceed to the injury of prior rights. He can proceed only upon an absence of 
injury to such rights if he hopes to perfect a right and be immune from liability. 
Legally, no one can be hurt by the procedure established by the Legislature. At the 
same time, however, it permits the development of our water resources to the utmost. 
*$ 
Eardley v. Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 1938). Thus, the applicant may proceed to divert and use 
water under the applicant's approved application, but such use is always subject to the rights of prior 
appropriators. The water rights of prior appropriators are not harmed, affected, or deprived by the 
State Engineer approving a new application—they still maintain the same rights they previously 
enjoyed. Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 113. If the actual diversion and use of water under an approved 
application interferes with prior rights, the prior appropriator has a cause of action against the junior 
appropriator. Id. at 114. 
If owners of approved applications or perfected water rights wish to change their approved 
point of diversion, place of use, or nature of use, they must file a change application with the State 
Engineer. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(a). Notices of change applications are also published in an 
appropriate newspaper. Before the applicant has the right to use water under the change application, 
the State Engineer must approve the application after determining, among the other criteria of Section 
73-3-3 and Section 73-3-8, whether there is a reason to believe the change can be approved without 
impairing other water rights. Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983); Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989). 
At the time of approval of either an application to appropriate or a change application, the State 
Engineer gives the applicant a certain time period within which to construct its works, place the water 
to beneficial use, and file proof of appropriation or permanent change. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-10, 
16. Sixty days prior to the date the proof of appropriation or permanent change is due, the State 
Engineer notifies the applicant by certified mail that such proof is due, and informs the applicant of its 
right to file a request for an extension of time within which to place the water to beneficial use. Utah 
Code Ann §§ 73-3-12, -16. Applicants then either file proof or an extension request with the State 
Engineer. 
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Upon receiving an extension request, the State Engineer takes action on the application without 
publishing notice if the application was approved less than 14 years prior to the filing of the extension 
request. If more than 14 years have elapsed, the State Engineer publishes notice in an appropriate 
newspaper to inform the public of the request. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e). Any interested person 
may file a protest with the State Engineer within 30 days after the publication of the notice. Utah Code 
Ann. §73-3-12 (l)(f). 
After the 30-day protest period terminates, the State Engineer determines whether to approve or 
deny the applicant's extension request. Pursuant to Section 73-3-12, the State Engineer is limited to 
considering whether the applicant "affirmatively shows" due diligence in placing the water to 
beneficial use or a reasonable cause for delay. If the State Engineer finds due diligence or reasonable 
cause for delay the extension request is granted. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(b). Otherwise, the 
previously approved application is lapsed. Utah Code Ann. §73-3-12(l)(g). Once lapsed, the applicant 
may request the State Engineer to reinstate the application. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18. But no further 
extension requests or reinstatements may be granted if the water works are not constructed within 50 
years of the date the application was approved. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(2). 
The extension request statute codifies an important concept and purpose of the western prior 
appropriation doctrine: "the overriding purpose of our water law [is] seeing that all available water is 
put to beneficial use. " Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1969). Utah's 
appropriation system "permits the development of our water resources to the utmost." Eardley, 11 
P.2d at 366. An extension request is one statutory mechanism the State Engineer uses to ensure that 
water rights are diligently developed so that the state's limited water resources are optimized. Thus, 
the principal purpose of extension request proceedings is to carry out state water policy. 
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In an extension request proceeding, the State Engineer takes action only on the applicant's 
request to extend the time within which to place water to beneficial use under a previously approved 
application. The State Engineer's action is directed only against the applicant's approved but 
unperfected application and not against the water rights of any other person. Other water rights are not 
threatened or at risk in an extension request proceeding. 
If an extension request is approved, other water rights are not thereby adversely affected. In the 
same manner as when the State Engineer approves applications to appropriate, when the State Engineer 
approves an extension request, all other water rights continue as originally approved; the same quantity 
of water may be diverted under the same priority date, from the same point of diversion, at the same 
place of use, and for the same nature of use. If an extension request is denied, other water rights also 
continue as originally approved. They are not adversely affected in any way. 
When the State Engineer decides that due diligence or reasonable cause for delay has not been 
shown and that an application must lapse, the State Engineer's decision may indirectly benefit other 
appropriators. However, because the affect is an indirect benefit to other appropriators, the decision 
does not adversely affect their water rights. The indirect benefit to other appropriators may occur if the 
rights under a lapsed application are from the same source of supply. If the State Engineer decides to 
lapse the application, the applicant has lost the right to perfect the application and divert water from the 
common source, thus decreasing the future competition for water in that source. But decreasing the 
future competition for water does not diminish or adversely affect in any way the water rights of other 
appropriators. 
Other water rights are not diminished or adversely affected in any way by the approval or 
denial of an extension request. Therefore, there is zero "risk of an erroneous deprivation." V-l Oil, 
317 Utah Adv. Rpt., at 13. Longley's water rights were not at risk of being deprived or adversely 
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affected in Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding. 
2. Utah Case Law Demonstrates that Other Water Rights Are Not at 
Risk of Being Deprived or Adversely Affected in an Extension 
Request Proceeding. 
In the Utah cases which have applied the requirements of due process to a property interest, the 
roperty interest was significantly threatened or at risk of being deprived by the state action.4 In 
contrast, Longley's water rights are not at risk of being deprived or adversely affected in Leucadia's 
Extension Request proceeding. Significantly, in a water rights case with facts similar to the case at 
hand, the Utah Supreme Court held that notice by publication was adequate because the State Engineer 
does not adjudicate or affect the water rights of the parties in his administrative proceedings. Whitmore 
v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748 (Utah 1944). 
In Whitmore, the plaintiff Whitmore attempted to challenge on due process grounds a change 
application that had been approved by the State Engineer several years prior to his challenge. Murray 
City's change application was filed in 1933. Notice of the application was subsequently given by 
publication in the newspaper as required by statute. The State Engineer approved the application at 
least four years prior to Whitmore bringing his lawsuit. Id. at 749-50. Even though more than four 
years had passed since the decision on the change application became final, Whitmore challenged the 
State Engineer's approval on the grounds that he was denied due process. Whitmore contended he was 
entitled to actual notice of the application by personal service rather than by publication. He argued 
4
 See e.g., Whitmer v. City ofLindon, 322 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1997) (resident's connection to 
secondary water service terminated by city); Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) (limousine 
operator's certificate of convenience and necessity revoked); Gray v. Dept. of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 807 (Utah 
1984) (unemployment compensation and benefits subject to being suspended); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm 'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) (liquor store's lease revoked by commission); Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1980) (fireman's right to continued employment deprived upon discharge); Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 
P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (resident's municipal water service discontinued); Horton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 
928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (public employee's membership in contributory retirement system denied). 
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the State Engineer's office had personal knowledge that Whitmore claimed a prior right which might 
be affected by the proposed change. Id. at 750. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Whitmore's due process arguments. The Court concluded 
that the water rights of the parties were not adjudicated by the State Engineer in Murray City's change 
application proceeding and, therefore, can not be affected by the State Engineer's administrative action. 
Id. The Court's reasoning is instructive: 
The office of state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights between 
parties, but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state. In 
Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362, this court considered the rights and duties 
of the state engineer in approving or denying an application for appropriation of water 
rights and we there held that in fulfilling his duties he acts in an administrative capacity 
only and has no authority to determine rights of parties. The same reasoning applies to 
the extent of the state engineer's authority when he determines to grant or deny an 
application for change of diversion, use or place. It follows that in granting Murray 
City the right to change its point of diversion and return, the state engineer did not 
adjudicate the priority to the use of the water at that point of diversion, but merely 
determined that it could use the water at that point as long as it did not interfere with the 
prior rights of others. The determination of the priority of rights is a judicial function 
and not among the powers of the state engineer. Since any action by the state engineer 
under this section cannot affect any vested right, it follows the court did not err in 
finding that notice by publication as provided therein, does not violate the due process 
clause of our constitution. 
Whitmore, 154 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added). See also Daniels Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 
571 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1977). 
The administrative proceedings of the State Engineer do not affect the vested water rights of the 
parties because the State Engineer has no authority to formally adjudicate those vested rights. The 
State Engineer acts only in his administrative capacity as he determines whether to approve or deny a 
particular water right application; no adjudication of the water rights occurs. The Whitmore Court said 
this is true even in proceedings involving change applications, where part of the criteria for approval 
includes determining whether the proposed change would impair other vested rights. Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 73-3-3(2)(b) (1989). This principle is even more applicable in extension request proceedings, where 
there is no statutorily required determination whether other vested rights might be affected by granting 
or denying an extension request.5 
The Whitmore case is dispositive. As a matter of law, other water rights, such as Longley's, are 
not adjudicated or affected, or even at any risk of being erroneously deprived, by the State Engineer's 
administrative action in extension request proceedings. 
3. The Notice by Publication of Leucadia's Extension Request Was 
Constitutionally Adequate. 
Because Longley's water rights are not at risk of being deprived or adversely affected in 
Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding, the statutorily required notice by publication of Leucadia's 
Extension Request was adequate. Whitmore, 154 P.2d at 750. Accordingly, the State Engineer was 
not required as a constitutional matter to give actual notice to Longley of Leucadia's Extension 
Request simply because Longley requested "notice of any further action on the matter." (R. 353-54). 
B. Longley's Desire to Protect and Defend His Water Rights in 
Leucadia's Extension Request Proceeding Is Not A Protected 
Property Interest. 
Longley's assertions that he has a cause of action to protect and defend his water rights and a 
right to demonstrate how his rights will be adversely affected are not protected property interests. 
First, a cause of action to protect and defend water rights which are not at issue in an extension request 
proceeding does not exist. Second, the issue of whether the approval of Leucadia's Extension Request 
5The conclusion that the State Engineer's actions in change application and extension request proceedings do not 
adjudicate or affect other persons water rights applies to all administrative actions of the State Engineer. In fulfilling his 
duties, the State Engineer is acting only in an administrative capacity and has no authority to adjudicate a person's vested 
rights. Eardley v Terry, 11 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1938) In any action the State Engineer is administratively determining 
whether a particular application or request should be approved or denied. Id. Whatever action the State Engineer took 
regarding Leucadia's water rights could not have adjudicated or adversely affected Longley's water rights. Therefore, 
Longley's due process argument fails under any scenario advanced. 
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may affect other water rights is not within the State Engineer's jurisdiction to determine in an 
extension request proceeding. Longley's assertions are essentially an unlawful collateral attack on 
Leucadia's approved 1970 Change Application.6 
1. A Cause of Action to Protect and Defend Water Rights Does Not 
Exist in an Extension Request Proceeding. 
Longley purports to have a right and cause of action to "protect" (Longley Brief at 11) and 
"defend" (Longley Brief at 15) his water rights in Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding. But such 
a right or cause of action does not exist. Asserting or manufacturing a cause of action does not in and 
of itself create a protected property interest. 
Not just any cause of action is a protected property interest. In order to be a protected property 
interest, the cause of action must be the means by which a claim for a protected property interest is 
asserted or otherwise protected from deprivation. See e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Service, Inc. 
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (creditor's cause of action against decedent's estate was seeking to 
protect an unpaid bill from being extinguished); Matter of Estate v. Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169 (Utah 
1991) (creditor's claim against decedent's estate was seeking to protect secured and unsecured claims 
against the estate from being extinguished). The cause of action itself does not create a protected 
property interest where there is no property interest needing protection; the property interest sought to 
be asserted or protected from deprivation invokes the due process protection. 
Longley incorrectly alleges he has the right to protect and defend his water rights in an 
extension request proceeding. But, as conclusively demonstrated in Section II. A., above, other water 
6
 It should be noted that Longley is not without a remedy to protect his water rights should the need arise. If the 
actual diversion and use of water by a junior appropriator interferes with Longley's water rights, Longley would be entitled 
to seek relief from the district court. See e.g., Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1944). (plaintiffs cause 
of action could only arise when defendant's act in changing point of diversion would deprive him of any water). Longley 
has not been deprived in any manner whatsoever of any opportunity to protect his water rights. 
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rights are not adjudicated or adversely affected in extension request proceedings. Furthermore, the 
State Engineer lacks subject matter jurisdiction over other water rights in extension request 
proceedings. Section III, infra. Because there is no threat or risk posed to other water rights, there is 
no cause of action to protect and defend those water rights in an extension request proceeding. 
Longley's alleged cause of action "to protect and defend" is not founded upon Utah law, does not exist 
and therefore, is not a protected property interest. 
2. The Determination of Whether the Approval of an Extension 
Request Will Adversely Affect Other Water Rights is Not an Issue in 
an Extension Request Proceeding and the State Engineer and the 
District Court on De Novo Review Has No Authority to Consider the 
Issue. 
Longley further wishes to demonstrate how the "approval of the subject Extension Requests 
can or will adversely affect Mr. Longley's water rights." (Longley Brief at 18). However, as 
previously discussed, the approval of Leucadia's Extension Request does not adversely affect 
Longley's water rights as a matter of law. Nevertheless, Longley claims to have the right to show how 
his water rights will be adversely affected by approval of the Extension Request. But such a right does 
not exist and is nothing more than a fabrication and a collateral attack on Leucadia's approved 1970 
Change Application. 
When the State Engineer acts on a particular water right application his jurisdiction is limited 
by the statutory criteria that governs that application. For example, the Utah Supreme Court recently 
addressed whether the State Engineer has authority in a change application proceeding to resolve water 
distribution disputes between mutual water companies and their shareholders. Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996). The Court concluded the State Engineer had no such 
authority because "the jurisdiction of the State Engineer's office is . . . circumscribed by the criteria 
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upon which the statute permits it to base its decisions." Id. at 750. 
Likewise, in extension request proceedings the State Engineer, and the district court on de novo 
review,7 are limited by the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (Utah 1989). Section 73-3-12 
provides, in relevant part: 
(l)(b) Extensions of time, not exceeding 50 years from the date of approval of the 
application, may be granted by the state engineer on proper showing of diligence or 
reasonable cause for delay. 
(g) In considering an application to extend the time in which to place water to beneficial 
use under an approved application, the state engineer shall deny the extension and 
declare the application lapsed, unless the applicant affirmatively shows that he has 
exercised or is exercising reasonable and due diligence in working toward completion of 
the appropriation. 
(h)(i) If reasonable and due diligence is shown by the applicant, the state engineer shall 
approve the extension. 
(j) The state engineer, in acting upon requests for extension of time, may, if he finds 
unjustified delay or lack of diligence in prosecuting the works to completion, deny the 
extension or may grant the request in part or upon conditions, including a reduction of 
the priority of all or part of the application. 
7This action was filed for judicial review of the State Engineer's decision approving Leucadia's fifth extension 
request pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 73-3-14 (1989) (R 168) As such, the district court has jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo whether the Extension Request should be approved or denied Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-15(l)(a) (Supp 
1995) In doing so, the district court stands in the same position as the State Engineer For example, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained the role of the trial court in an appeal from an application to appropriate proceeding as follows 
When an appeal is taken from the decision of the State Engineer in such a case, the trial court is required 
to determine the same questions de novo It determines whether the application should be approved or 
rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties beyond the determination of that matter The issues 
remain the same upon an appeal to this court All that the district court, or this court on appeal from the 
district court, is called upon to do is to determine whether the application should be rejected or 
approved 
It should simply determine whether the application was rightly rejected In determining that question, 
the court stands in the same position as the state engineer did 
Eardley v Terry, 11 P 2d 362, 365, 366 (Utah 1938) For a further refinement of the trial de novo principle, see Badger, 
922 P 2d at 751 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-12(l)(b), -(g), -(h)(1), -0) (1989) (emphasis added). 
Nowhere in Section 73-3-12 is the State Engineer authorized to determine whether the approval 
of an extension request will "adversely affect" other water rights. The State Engineer and the district 
court on de novo review do not examine and have no authority to determine whether the previously 
approved application or the extension request itself adversely affects any other water rights. The only 
issues before the State Engineer on an extension request is whether the applicant made a proper 
showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay. Thus, protestants may only properly address those 
issues.8 
Longley's desire to demonstrate how Leucadia's water rights may affect his rights should have 
been acted on in 1970 when Leucadia applied for the 1970 Change Application involving new points 
of diversion in the Sand Mountain area. The State Engineer examines impairment of existing water 
rights in change application proceedings: "No change may be made if it impairs any vested right 
without just compensation." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(b). Thus, the State Engineer may approve a 
change application if "there is reason to believe that the proposed change can be made without 
impairing vested rights." Salt Lake City v Boundary Springs Water Users Assw., 270 P.2d 453, 455 
(Utah 1954). 
furthermore, the mere fact that § 73-3-12 allows protests to be filed does not expand the inquiry beyond the 
statutory criteria for approval The Utah Supreme Court stated with regard to protests filed against applications to 
appropriate 
Under the statute, section 100-3-8, RS Utah 1933, when an application is filed, the state engineer is 
required to determine whether there is unappropriated water in the proposed source of supply and 
whether the water sought to be appropriated can be put to a beneficial use and can be diverted from the 
source of supply without doing material injury to the prior rights of others While the statute, R S 1933, 
100-3-7, provides for the filing of protests to any application to appropriate water, this does not enlarge 
the scope of the proceedings before the state engineer beyond the determination of the question above 
stated 
Eardley, 11 P 2d at 365 (emphasis added) 
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Leucadia's groundwater rights in the Sand Mountain area were approved in 1971 under the 
1970 Change Application. Longley may not at this late date assert that his water rights are adversely 
affected by the rights Leucadia enjoys under the approved 1970 Change Application. Such an attempt 
is nothing more than an unlawful collateral attack on the final agency decision that approved 
Leucadia's 1970 Change Application. 
C. Longley Did Not Have a "Constitutional Right to Protest." 
Contrary to Longley's conclusion that he had a "constitutional right to protest state action that 
would affect his vested property rights," (Longley Brief at 18), the right to protest an extension request 
is simply an opportunity afforded the public by statute to voice concerns and viewpoints. 
In the context of the State Engineer's administrative proceedings, the right to protest is not a 
due process requirement of the Utah Constitution. The procedures provided, such as an opportunity to 
protest, are not "property" protected by due process. Cleveland Board of Education v. LoudermilU 470 
U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
The State Engineer, upon receiving an extension request, is required by statute to publish in an 
appropriate newspaper notice of the extension request. As with the approximately 3,000 various water 
right applications which are advertised by the State Engineer each year,9 notice is given to the public so 
that any interested person may file a protest to voice concerns and provide viewpoints to the State 
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Engineer. Badger, 922 P.2d at 750, n. 9.'° The concerns and viewpoints presented assist the State 
Engineer in determining whether the various water right applications should be approved or denied. 
Section 73-3-12 creates no vested or constitutional right to protest. Id. Rather, Section 73-3-12 
provides an opportunity for those with genuine concerns to present them to the State Engineer for his 
consideration.1' 
9







































Utah Division of Water Rights Annual Reports on file at the Division of Water Rights. 
10
 In a recent explanation by the Utah Supreme Court regarding the purposes of protests and publishing notice of 
water right applications, the Court stated: 
Although this provision does appear to acknowledge the wide range of interests and 
impacts relating to allocation and adjustment of water rights, it does not create in any 
"interested" person a vested right to protest and subsequent entitlement to appeal. 
Rather it simply allows those persons who have a genuine concern about proposed 
changes in water rights to voice those concerns before the State Engineer and, as an 
important corollary, provides the State Engineer with all viewpoints relevant to any 
proposal. 
Badger, 922 P.2d at 750, n. 9. 
11
 Neither is the opportunity to protest in order to decrease the future competition for water a "constitutional right." 
Decreasing the future competition for water is an incidental benefit of the State Engineer's decision to lapse an application. 
Obviously, if an extension request is denied, no other appropriator's rights are adversely affected. No other appropriator's 
rights are automatically increased by the lapsing of a water right. If another appropriator wishes to play a role in the State 
Engineer's decision, ample opportunity exists by filing a timely protest pursuant to § 73-3-12. Also, other appropriators 
have the opportunity to challenge directly another appropriator's due diligence by filing a request for agency action with 
the State Engineer pursuant to § 73-3-13. 
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D. Simply Because Longley Raised Various Claims and Requested 
"Notice of Any Further Action" Did Not Entitle Longley to Actual 
Notice. 
Longley contends he was entitled to more notice than the statutory-mandated notice by 
publication because of the circumstances surrounding a 1992 State Engineer decision.12 (Longley Brief 
at 23, 24.) Longley also contends he was entitled to actual notice because in 1989 he requested "notice 
of any further action." (R. 353-54). (Longley Brief at 24-28.) But such contentions fail. 
A person does not acquire a constitutional right to actual notice by simply raising various 
claims or by contacting the State Engineer and requesting notice. Persons are entitled to due process 
protection when their protected property interests are at risk of being deprived by state action. As 
previously discussed, Longley had no protected property interest at risk of being deprived or adversely 
affected in Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding. The notice by publication was adequate under 
the circumstances of this case. Longley was not entitled to actual notice in the proceeding simply 
because he requested it and thereby became "reasonably ascertainable." 
Longley attempts to convince this Court that its ruling will only be limited to Longley and have 
no broader implications. (Longley Brief at 27.) But, the impacts could be devastating to the State's 
12
 Longley contends that the denial of Leucadia's Request for Reconsideration of the State Engineer's July 10, 
1992 Memorandum Decision was automatic by operation of law. (See e.g., Longley Brief at 43.) Longley's contentions, 
however, are contrary to well-established Utah law. Both of Utah's appellate courts have addressed the nature of the 20-
day "deemed denied" period in § 63-46b-13(3)(b) of UAPA. See e.g. Harper Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 868 P.2d 
813,815-16 (Utah 1994); 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Comm 7i, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied 878 
P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Both courts have held that state agencies may act on requests for reconsideration beyond the 20-
day period. Id. If an agency acts on a request after the 20-day period expires, it merely resets the 30-day period to seek 
judicial review under § 63-46b-14. The same result follows under the Division Rule R655-6-17 (1992), which essentially 
replicates the statutory language in § 63-46b-13, and which must be harmonized with Rule R655-6-18. Rule R655-6-18 
conditions judicial review on following § 63-46b-14, the same statute the Harper and 49th Street Galleria Courts relied 
upon to reach their holdings. Rule R655-6-17 is directory only and does not act to deny the Division from acting upon a 
request for reconsideration after the 20-day period has expired. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'A?, 916 P.2d 
344, 351 (Utah 1996). In addition, the State Engineer's grant of Leucadia's Request for Reconsideration was filed in the 
records in the State Engineer's office. (R. 54.) Longley, like all persons, is charged with constructive notice of those 
records. Contrary to Longely's allegations, the grant of the request for reconsideration did not trigger a "greater duty on 
the part of the State Engineer to countermand . . . the practical effect of [his] decision." (Longley Brief at 22.) 
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interest in maintaining secure and stable water rights and could create impossible administrative 
burdens for the State Engineer. 
The facts, as stated by Longley, are: 
In late October or early November 1989, I contacted the State Engineer's Office 
to see if I could intervene at that time in any way and requested that I be given 
notice of any further action on the matter. 
(R. 353-54).13 The State Engineer is responsible for administering approximately 120,000 water rights. 
The State Engineer has no statutory or regulatory duty to keep track of all persons who may "contact" 
his office over the years and request notice of any further action on particular water rights. If such a 
duty were found to exist by reason of due process, as urged by Longley, thousands of persons, 
including water users and other members of the public, could contact the State Engineer's office and 
simply ask for "notice of any further action" on any number of water right matters. The State 
Engineer would then be obligated to prepare and mail annually potentially thousands of notices 
whenever any of the multiple types of water right applications are filed or action is taken on those 
applications. Such a task is overwhelmingly burdensome on the State Engineer and contrary to the 
reasonable procedures outlined by the Legislature. 
Not only would the procedural requirement suggested by Longley be unduly burdensome and 
impossible to administer, it would also put at risk the stability of water rights in this State. For 
example, should the State Engineer fail to provide actual notice to persons who "contacted" the State 
Engineer's office, then any action taken on those potentially thousands of water right proceedings 
n
 Another salient fact is that an extension request proceeding is an administrative proceeding, unlike general 
adjudications of water rights that adjudicate all water rights within a certain drainage area in a judicial proceeding The 
case at hand is thereby clearly distinguishable from cases cited by Longley which involve general adjudication 
proceedings See e g , Department of Ecology v Acquavella, 61A P 2d 160 (Wash 1983) 
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could be put in jeopardy and subject to litigation. The water rights administration process would 
thereby become unduly burdensome for water users and the security of their water rights would 
become uncertain and subject to unnecessary risk. 
The notice-by-publication procedure for water right applications has been followed and relied 
upon by the water user community and the public for over 90 years. See Laws of Utah 1903, ch. 100, § 
37. The Legislatively created procedure has served this State well and is adequate for due process 
purposes. Whitmore, 154 P.2d at 750. The notice by publication of Leucadia's Extension Request was 
constitutionally adequate and Longley was not entitled to actual notice simply because he requested it. 
III. THE APRIL 1994 PUBLISHED NOTICE COMPLIED WITH 
UTAH LAW. 
The April 1994 Notice of Leucadia's Extension Request fully complied with Utah law. The 
district court found that the notice "contained information that informed the public of the diligence 
claimed and the reason for the request. . . [and] described the water rights at issue with sufficient 
detail[.]" (R. 535.) The district court also properly concluded that "[t]he State Engineer's notice [by] 
publication of Leucadia's Extension Request was sufficient to comply with Utah law." (R. 536.) 
Longley challenges the district court's findings and conclusions, and hence, the validity of the State 
Engineer's approval of the Extension Request, on the basis that the published notice did not strictly 
comply with state law. (Longley Brief at 33-42.) Both of Longley's arguments-that the notice did not 
strictly comply with the statute and that strict compliance with the statute is necessary—are without 
merit. 
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A. The Published Notice Strictly Complied with the Statutory 
Requirements. 
Before they may be approved by the State Engineer, notices of requests for extensions of time 
must be published in compliance with Section 73-3-12(1) of the Utah Code, which provides, in 
relevant part: 
(e)(i) The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the 
source of supply is located. 
(ii) The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of the 
diligence claimed and the reason for the request. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(i), -(ii) (1989). The published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request 
satisfied these requirements. Notice was published for three successive weeks, on April 1, April 7, and 
April 14, 1994, in the Daily Spectrum newspaper in Washington County, the county in which the Water 
Rights are located. (R. 287,290, 535.) The notice clearly described the nature of the proceedings and 
correctly identified the water rights at issue. The published notice informed the public of the diligence 
claimed; the notice stated that Leucadia was proposing to add six points of diversion to the Water Rights, 
includingsix 16-inch underground water wells up to 800-feet deep. (R. 290, 535.) The notice also 
indicated that the reason for the extension request was that more time was needed to place the water to 
beneficial use in Washington County. (R. 290, 535.) The notice also contained the correct legal 
descriptions of the six proposed points of diversion. The April 1994 notice clearly provided Longley and 
the public with adequate and proper notice of Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding. 
Longley contends that the notice provision in the extension request statute should be strictly 
construed to avoid constitutional difficulties. Longley argues that such difficulties can be avoided only if 
adequate notice is provided to parties, such as Longley, with affected property interests. (Longley Brief 
at 33.) Appellees have demonstrated, however, that Longley's water rights were not at issue in the 
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Extension Request proceeding and could not have been adversely affected. Therefore, there are no 
"constitutional difficulties with the statute. See Section II, supra. An analysis of the notice provision 
and the State Engineer's jurisdiction under the extension request statute further demonstrates that only 
Leucadia's Water Rights were at issue in the proceedings before the State Engineer. 
1. The State Engineer's Jurisdiction is Limited under the Extension 
Request Statute and the Notice Provision is Consistent with that 
Limited Jurisdiction. 
As an administrative agency, the Division of Water Rights, including the State Engineer as its 
director, receives its authority as a matter of statutory grant. See e.g., Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service 
Comm 'n, 917 P.2d 1083,1084 (Utah 1996); Pierceyv. Civil Service Comm 'n, 208 P.2d 1123,1126 (Utah 
1949). Such authority is limited by the legislative grant. Harmon, 917 P.2d 1084. The Utah Supreme 
Court has recently held that the State Engineer's jurisdiction, and therefore, his authority may be 
"circumscribed by the criteria upon which the statute permits [him] to base [his] decision." Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 750-51 (Utah 1996). Under Section 73-3-12, the scope of the State 
Engineer's deliberations regarding extension requests is limited to determining whether the applicant 
affirmatively shows that diligence has been pursued in constructing the required waterworks or whether 
the applicant can show a reasonable cause for delay. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(g)( 1989). The 
State Engineer is not authorized to reopen the change application proceeding to reconsider any of the 
criteria associated with the approval of the change application. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-3, -8 
(1989). The determination in change application proceedings regarding whether existing rights may be 
impaired by the approval of the requested change is not within the State Engineer's jurisdiction in an 
extension request proceeding. Thus, the only subject matter over which the State Engineer has 
jurisdiction in an extension request proceeding is whether to approve or deny the extension request. The 
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extension request statute is not designed to grant the State Engineer jurisdiction or authority over 
Longley's water rights, or any other non-applicant's water rights. The plain language of the notice 
provision is consistent with the limited jurisdictional grant. 
The notice provision in Section 73-3-12 is a "public notice" provision intended to provide notice 
of the pending extension request to the general public. It clearly is not designed to secure personal 
jurisdiction over other water users or "persons interested." Indeed, under the statutory grant, the State 
Engineer can approve an extension request for fourteen years after a change application is approved 
without even giving notice of the request.14 This demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to grant 
the State Engineer jurisdiction over any substantive rights other than the applicant's rights associated with 
the request. Statutes must be construed as a whole, giving effect to all of their provisions, and those 
provisions must be reconciled and harmonized. Magnesium Corp. of America v. Air Quality Bd., 941 
P.2d 653,659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The obvious conclusion upon reading Section 73-3-12(l)(d) 
together with Section 73-3-12(l)(e) is that the notice provision is a public notice provision, not a 
jurisdictional notice provision. 
Furthermore, the State Engineer, not Longley, is the party that is protected by the public notice 
provision in Section 73-3-12(1). The notice provision is designed to provide notice to the public of a 
pending extension request and to invite an interested public to participate in the proceedings. 
Participation by an interested public ensures that the State Engineer receives all of the possible viewpoints 
relevant to the request and ensures that the State Engineer is fully informed. Badger, 922 P.2d at 750 n.9. 
The notice provision is not intended to protect water users, or other "persons interested," whose rights are 
14
 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(d) (1989) provides: 
Extensions not exceeding 14 years after the date of approval may be granted by affidavit and shall be filed in the office of 
the State Engineer on or before the date fixed for filing proof of appropriation. 
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not within the statutory jurisdiction of the State Engineer. Neither does the notice provision create "a 
vested right to protest and subsequent entitlement to appeal." Id. Longley's assertion that the notice 
provision "was designed to protect the public and other water users from unwarranted and unnotified 
deprivations of their property interests" demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of 
extension request proceedings. (Longley Brief at 34.) 
2. The April 1994 Notice Contained All of the Elements Required by the 
Extension Request Statute. 
Longley contends that the published notice did not contain certain elements required by the 
statute, and therefore, failed to comply with the statutory requirements. (Longley Brief at 29-32,35-41.) 
Longley complains that the notice did not contain "evidence" of the diligence claimed, the reason for the 
delay/request, and adequate legal descriptions for the locations of the proposed wells. (Longley Brief at 
36-37,37-40, and 29-32,40-41, respectively.) Longley is wrong. 
The notice provision provides, in pertinent part: 
The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of the diligence claimed 
and the reason for the request. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii)( 1989). The plain language of the statute does not require that the 
notice contain an express declaratory statement regarding the diligence claimed or the reason for the 
extension request. It also does not require, as Longley seems to assert, that "evidence" be provided of the 
diligence claimed, nor does it require that the notice contain such information that the public can ascertain 
whether the applicant will be able to make an affirmative showing before the State Engineer of the 
diligence claimed. {See Longley Brief at 36-37.) Instead, the plain language of the statute only requires 
that information be given of the diligence claimed If no diligence is claimed, such as where the 
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construction of the required waterworks is reasonably delayed, the notice of an extension request is not 
deficient or inadequate if it does not contain information regarding diligence that is not claimed. The 
notice provision only requires that information be given of the diligence claimed, if there is diligence 
claimed. 
a. The April 1994 notice provided information that informed the public 
of the diligence claimed 
In the case of the April 1994 notice, however, information was provided that informed the public 
of the diligence claimed, or in other words, of the status of the construction of the required waterworks. 
The published notice stated: 
Terracor (Leucadia Financial Corp.) proposes to change the POD [points of diversion] of 
water as evidenced by [the Water Rights]... [by] adding the following... wells. 
(R. 290.) Thus, the notice apprised the public regarding the status of the construction of the waterworks 
required by the Change Application. 
The scope and detail of the information that must be included in the notice to the public under the 
notice provision is determined in large part by considering the purpose of the extension request statute. 
The purpose of the statute is to ensure that water rights are diligently developed. As previously discussed, 
the principal purposes of the notice provision are: (1) to ensure the State Engineer is fully informed 
regarding the pending extension request; and (2) to give interested members of the public an opportunity 
to participate in the proceedings. Because the published notice is not jurisdictional, it does not require 
that all water users in the water basin be fully informed so that they can prepare to defend their individual 
substantive rights. Those rights are not at risk. The detail required to be published need only be 
sufficient to inform the public of the diligence claimed or, that is to say, the status of the effort to 
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construct the required waterworks. 
The April 1994 notice states that Leucadia was proposing to add six new wells as additional 
points of diversion. Because Leucadia was proposing to add the wells, obviously, the wells had not been 
constructed. This information indicates the status of the construction of the required waterworks, and 
therefore, informed the public of the diligence (or effort) claimed. The public was informed that the 
required works had not been constructed, and that no well had been completed as originally proposed. 
This certainly is sufficient information to inform an interested or concerned public about the diligence 
claimed, and to permit the public to decide whether to participate in Leucadia's Extension Request 
proceedings. 
Longley's apparent assertions that the information published in the notice regarding the diligence 
claimed must be proffered as evidence of the construction of the works and application of water to 
beneficial use (Longley Brief at 36), and must be "statements of actions that [would be] adequate to 
constitute diligence" (Longley Brief at 37) are misleading and are not based on existing law. Clearly, 
there is no "evidentiary standard" in the plain language of the notice provision, nor is there a statutory 
requirement that the notice spell out the diligence claimed (or reason for the request) in detail sufficient to 
make the affirmative showing before the State Engineer. 
b. The April 1994 notice provided the reason for the Extension Request 
Longley states that "Utah law . . . requires that the notice published for an Extension Request 
inform the public of the reason for the delay." (Longley Brief at 37 (emphasis added).) Longley grossly 
misstates the plain language of the notice provision. The statute provides that information must be given 
to inform the public of "the reason for the request" Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii)(1989) (emphasis 
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added). The statute requires that the reason for the request be given, not the reason for delay.1' 
Furthermore, the plain language of the statute also does not require that the notice contain a brief 
declarative statement or justification for delay. (See e.g., Longley Brief at 38.) Nevertheless, Longley's 
contentions aside, the April 1994 notice complied with the statutory requirement because it provided the 
reason for Leucadia's Extension Request. The notice stated: 
It is represented that additional time is needed to place the water to beneficial use in 
Washington County. 
(R. 290 (emphasis added).) Thus, the published notice stated that the reason for the request was "that 
additional time [was] needed to place the water to beneficial use in Washington County." 
Longley mistakenly refers to the statement in the published notice as part of the "boiler-plate 
introductory language" at the top of the notice. (Longley Brief at 38.) However, the statement providing 
the reason is not "boiler-plate introductory language;" it is an independent sentence that clearly indicates 
the reason for the request. In fact, it uses the exact prefatory phrase that was used in Leucadia's earlier 
extension requests: "It is represented that." (See e.g., R. 369-70,372.) It is hard to understand why 
Longley accepts that such language is sufficient when used in the earlier requests, but is unwilling to 
acceptitassufficientinthe April 1994 notice. (Seee.g. Longley'sBriefat 39; R. 341.) Again, Longley 
is requiring that the notice contain information that will satisfy the "affirmative showing" requirement 
regarding justified or unjustified delay. Longley misreads the notice provision because there is no such 
requirement in the law. 
15
 In fact, an extension request may not even involve any delay. The construction of the required waterworks may 
have just taken longer than expected. 
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G. The April 1994 notice correctly located each of the proposed wells. 
Longley also complains that the legal descriptions for the proposed wells in the published notice 
were inaccurate, inadequate, uncertain, and confusing. Therefore, Longley argues, he failed to receive 
adequate notice of Leucadia's Extension Request. (Longley Brief at 30,40.) Again, Longley is simply 
wrong. Each new point of diversion was referenced to a corner, section number, and township and range. 
Examining the legal descriptions for the wells as published16 and comparing them with the legal 
descriptions listed in the 1970 Change Application demonstrates that the published legal descriptions 
were accurate and complete. 
The April 1994 notice legal descriptions were published as follows: 
POD: Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 16 in. wells 0 to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 
50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253 fromNW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 fromNW Cor, (4) S 50 
W 66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, T42S, 
R14W. 
(R. 290.) The well locations were published in a sentence form, which relied upon commas as 
punctuation for several important and sometimes multiple purposes. The commas were used to separate 
the references to the individual wells, which are indicated by serial numbers enclosed within parentheses. 
Thisisa very common style of usage. Seee.g., The Chicago Manual of Style 173 (14th ed. 1993). The 
commas were also used to indicate the omission of words that are understood by the context of the 
sentence. This is known as an elliptical construction and also is often used. Id. at 176. In addition, the 
commas were used to separate elements that grammatically belonged to two or more wells, but were 
16
 In his brief, Longley lists the proposed new points of diversion in a form that is misleading. (See Longley Brief 
at 9, 29 n.16.) The points of diversion as published were not listed in a table, they were listed in the form of a sentence that 
used punctuation very purposefully. Longley's tabular listing misleadingly isolates the courses and distances for the 
individual diversion points and de-emphasizes the punctuation used. While a tabular listing is convenient for comparison 
purposes, Longley's tabular listing is inaccurate because it distorts the actual published notice. 
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expressed only after the last well. This also is an accepted usage of commas.17 See e.g. New York Public 
Library Writer's Guide to Style and Usage 255 (1994). 
It is apparent from the published legal descriptions for the proposed points of diversion that the 
comma following the course and distance for wells (1) and (4) replaces the phrase "from NW Cor, Sec 
25" for well (1) and "from NE Cor," for well (4). This usage style follows the pattern in the 
"HERETOFORE' section of the published notice, where the course and distance are followed by the 
relevant comer reference. (See e.g. R. 290.) Also apparent is that the commas following the indicated 
comers in the descriptions for wells (3), (4), and (5) replace "Sec 26," which follows the comer indicator 
for well (6). Also consistent with the pattern in the HERETOFORE section of the notice is that the 
township and range for each point is placed at the end of the "sentence," and therefore, follows the 
preceding section number(s). This is the third type of usage described above. 
The legal descriptions of the proposed wells, when read as a sentence consistent with the 
form in which they were actually published, were properly punctuated (no semi-colon necessary (Longley 
Brief at 29)), used conventional usage styles, and properly attributed each course and distance for the 
individual wells to a comer, section, township, and range. Moreover, comparing the descriptions in the 
April 1994 notice and the legal descriptions listed in the approved 1970 Change Application demonstrates 
that the April 1994 legal descriptions are accurate and complete. 
17
 A further example of this style of usage is: "We approve of, and are willing to participate in, the new 4-day work 
week." The element "the new 4-day work week" belongs to both of the proceeding phrases. New York Public Library 
Writer's Guide to Style and Usage 255(1994). 
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Wells as Listed in April 1994 Notice Equivalent Wells as Listed in Change Application 
(1) S 50 E 2531, S 49.5 feet and E 2531 from NW cor. Sec. 25, 
T42S,R14W, 
(2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor, Sec 25, S 2343 feet and E 253 feet from NW cor. Sec. 25, 
T42S,R14W, 
(3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, S 49.5 feet and E 49.5 [feet] from NW cor. Sec. 26, T42S, 
R14W, 
(4) S 50 W 66, S 49.5 feet and W 66 feet from NE cor. Sec. 26, 
T42S,R14W, 
(5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, S 2343 feet and W 49.5 feet from NE cor. 
Sec.26,T42S,R14W, 
(6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, S 2343 feet and E 2970 feet from NW cor. Sec. 26, 
T42S,R14W T42S,R14W, 
All SLB&M. 
Examining the descriptions in the April 1994 notice, locations of wells (1) and (2) are measured from the 
NW corner of Section 25, well (3) is measured from the NW corner of Section 26, wells (4) and (5) are 
measured from the NE corner of Section 26, and well (6) is measured from the NW corner of Section 26. 
All of the wells are located in Township 42 South, Range 14 West. Based on the township and range, it 
is obvious that the descriptions are based on the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; there is no other official 
base and meridian in Washington County. The only difference between the legal descriptions in the April 
1994 notice and the 1970 Change Application involves the removal of redundant information from the 
April 1994 notice. The legal descriptions correctly state the locations of the proposed wells. The notice 
fully complied with the statutory requirements. 
Longley's reliance on Eldorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Cook, 822 P.2d 672 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) 
is misplaced. In Eldorado, the published notice contained a significant error, it located the land 
affected by the pending change application in the wrong land grant. Id. at 673. The Eldorado Court 
remanded the matter based on a procedural error, the publication of an inaccurate legal description.18 
18
 It is worth noting that the Eldorado Court did not remand the matter based on the lack of actual notice or personal 
service, as Longley urges here. Obviously, notice by publication of the change application is sufficient to meet due process 
concerns in New Mexico, as it is in Utah. Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1944). 
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Id. at 675. Leucadia's Extension Request proceeding clearly is distinguishable from the Eldorado case 
because the April 1994 notice does not contain inaccurate legal descriptions for the proposed wells. 
The Eldorado decision is further distinguishable because the Eldorado matter concerned a proceeding 
involving a change application, whereas, the present matter involves Leucadia's Extension Request 
proceeding. The difference is significant because the extension request proceeding only involves 
Leucadia's water rights, no other rights can be adversely affected by the State Engineer's Decision. 
B. Strict Compliance with the Notice Provision is not Required. 
Longley argues that due process concerns require that the State Engineer must strictly comply 
with the statutory notice requirements in Section 73-3-12(l)(e). (Longley Brief at 33-35.) Longley 
relies on Utah cases that have held that strict compliance is required whenever a party's substantive 
rights may be affected. (Longley Brief at 33, citing Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 760-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).) 
However, Longley's concerns are misplaced and his arguments must fail because Longley's 
substantive rights cannot be affected in the Extension Request proceeding. Under Section 73-3-12, the 
State Engineer has not been granted jurisdiction over the public and other water users' substantive 
rights, either with or without published notice. Accordingly, Longley's substantive rights are not at 
risk in Leucadia's Extension Request proceedings. 
Although the April 1994 notice did strictly comply with Section 73-3-12(l)(e), assuming 
arguendo that the published notice was technically deficient in some respect, nevertheless, the published 
notice substantially complied with the statutory requirements. In the absence of statutory language 
requiring strict adherence or establishing a prohibition as a consequence of noncompliance with the 
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statutory requirement, substantial compliance with a notice statute is sufficient. Stahl v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 618 P.2d480,482-83 (Utah 1980); accord Felida Neighborhood Assoc, v. Clark County, 913 
P.2d 823, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) ("Failure to satisfy the notice requirements of the statute is excused 
where substantial compliance resulted in full and adequate notice."), review denied, 922 P.2d 98 (Wash.). 
Moreover, as this Court recognized in Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1995): 
When determining whether substantial statutory compliance as opposed to strict 
statutory compliance should be permitted, we must be ascertain [sic] whether full 
protection under the statute would be enjoyed by the party the statute seeks to protect. If 
"substantial. . . compliance satisfies the policy of the statute[,]" then strict compliance is 
not in order.. . . Furthermore, "[cjourts in evaluating the necessity for strict compliance. . 
. focus upon the nature of the statutory requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If 
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and 
possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict compliance. On the other hand, if 
the requirements are merely procedural and will not prejudice one of the parties, 
substantial compliance is sufficient." 
Id. at 23 (citations omitted). Longley's substantive rights were not at risk in Leucadia's Extension 
Request proceeding, and therefore, Longley's rights could not be adversely affected. The State Engineer, 
not Longley, is the protected party under the notice provision. The publication of the notice of Leucadia's 
Extension Request was merely procedural and intended to ensure that the State Engineer was fully 
informed in the proceeding. Therefore, substantial compliance with the notice provision was sufficient. 
Under either a strict or substantial compliance analysis, the April 1994 notice complied with Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case it was not state action which deprived Longley of a protected property interest. 
Rather, it was Longley's inaction which deprived Longley of an opportunity to protest Leucadia's 
Extension Request. The district court's "Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" 
should be affirmed. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The Appellees request both oral argument and a published opinion from the Utah Court of 
Appeals. A fully reasoned opinion after oral argument should be issued because this case involves the 
fundamental procedures by which the State Engineer administers the 120,000 water rights of the State 
and provides notice of the approximately 3,000 various water right applications filed each year. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of September, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
fy^ft 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY 
JOHN H. MABEY, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
Utah State Engineer 
W^6t>& %, 
CHARD C. SKEEN, 
BRYON J. BENEVENTO 
THOMAS W. CLAWSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
Leucadia Financial Corporation 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September, 1997, two true and correct copies of the 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES were served by mailing the same, first-class postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
J. Craig Smith 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Annette F. Sorensen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
175 East 200 North 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Richard C. Skeen (2971) 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
Thomas W. Clawson (5679) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Leucadia Financial Corporation 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)532-3333 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL O. LONGLEY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL ) 
CORPORATION, TERRACOR, INC., ) 
THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipal ) 
corporation, and ROBERT L. MORGAN, ] 
State Engineer of the State of Utah, } 
Defendants. ) 




LEUCADIA FINANCIAL : 
CORPORATION, TERRACOR, INC., 
Cross-Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. 95-0501270 CV 
> Hon. James L. Shumate 
' \ \ * / 
^.34} (A-D 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment came before this Court for 
hearing on October 23, 1996. The Honorable James L. Shumate presided. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by his counsel, J. Craig Smith. Defendant, Leucadia Financial 
Corporation ("Leucadia"), was represented by Bryon J. Benevento. Defendant, Robert L. 
Morgan, was represented by John H. Mabey, Jr. Defendant, the City of St. George, was 
represented by Gary G. Kuhlmann. Based upon the Motions for Summary Judgment, 
Memoranda in Support of the Motions for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply Memoranda in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, affidavits submitted in support and in opposition to the Motions for Summary 
Judgment, oral argument of counsel, and for other good cause appearing thereon; 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS as follows: 
1. On April 1, 7 and 14, 1994, the State Engineer published notice of 
Leucadia's Extension Request in the Daily Spectrum newspaper in Washington County, Utah; 
2. The published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request contained 
information that informed the public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request; 
3. The published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request described the 
water rights at issue with sufficient detail; 
4. Plaintiff concedes that he did not file a protest with the State Engineer 
within thirty (30) days of the published notice of Leucadia's Extension Request. 
WHEREFORE, THE COURT CONCLUDES as follows: 
196M18091 1 ^ 
_ (A-2) 
1. The State Engineer's notice of publication of Leucadia's Extension 
Request was sufficient to comply with Utah law. 
2. Plaintiffs protest of Leucadia's Extension Request, if any, was untimely 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1989) and the Utah Administrative Code § R655-6-
3(F) (1994); 
3. Interested persons must file protests with the State Engineer within 30 
days after the notice of an extension request is published in order to participate in the 
administrative proceedings as a party. Plaintiff did not participate in the administrative 
proceedings as a party, and therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1989) and §§ 63-46b-l, 14 (1993); and 
4. Plaintiff lacks standing to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's 
decision approving Leucadia's Extension Request because he did not file a timely protest, and 
therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-14 (1993). 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
are granted, and plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Cross-Claim filed by the City of St. 
George against Leucadia is moot since it is premised upon plaintiff prevailing against 
defendants in the underlying action. Accordingly, the Cross-Claim is dismissed without 
prejudice. 
196X118091 1 * 
(A-3) 
DATED this 
Approved as to form: 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
day of November, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Barnes L. Shumate -\,
 ( 
Fifth Judicial Distracfc^urt Jud; 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
\date \3k. 
By: 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
Attorney for Robert L. Morgan 
\date AU. \,<WCP 
ST. GEORGE CITY ATTORNEY 
^r,y^M^ 
Gary~tj. Kuhlmann S 
Attorney for City of St. George 
\date / / ^ - ^ 
«?37 (A"4) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
J/u-tt^ ^frfa/^.^^ By: JU^it^J ^-Mf^^e^t-— \date / / W - f £ 
TrTomas W. Clawson 
Attorneys for Leucadia Financial Corporation 
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
73-3-14, Judicial review — State engineer as defendant, 
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain 
judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be in the county in which the stream or water source, or some part of it, is 
located. 
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as a defendant in all suits to review 
his decisions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation may be 
rendered against him. 
( A - 6 ) 
73-3-12. Time limit on construction and application — Ex-
tensions — Approval — Decisions of engineer — 
Appeal — Application without proof. 
(1) (a) The construction of the works and the application of water to benefi-
cial use shall be diligently prosecuted to completion within the time fixed 
by the state engineer. 
(b) Extensions of time, not exceeding 50 years from the date of ap-
proval of the application, may be granted by the state engineer on proper 
showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay. 
(c) All requests for extension of time shall be made by affidavit and 
shall be filed in the office of the state engineer on or before the date fixed 
for filing proof of appropriation. 
(d) Extensions not exceeding 14 years after the date of approval may be 
granted by the state engineer upon a sufficient showing by affidavit, but 
extensions beyond 14 years shall be granted only after application and 
publication of notice. 
(e) (i) The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county 
in which the source of supply is located. 
(ii) The notice shall contain information that will inform the pub-
lic of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request. 
(f) Any person interested may, at any time within (30) days after the 
notice is published, file a protest with the state engineer. 
(g) In considering an application to extend the time in which to place 
water to beneficial use under an approved application, the state engineer 
shall deny the extension and declare the application lapsed, unless the 
applicant affirmatively shows that he has exercised or is exercising rea-
sonable and due diligence in working toward completion of the appropria-
tion. 
(h) (i) If reasonable and due diligence is shown by the applicant, the 
state engineer shall approve the extension. 
(ii) The approved extension is effective so long as the applicant 
continues to exercise reasonable diligence in completing the appro-
priation, 
(i) The state engineer shall consider the holding of an approved appli-
cation by any municipality, metropolitan water district, or other public 
agency to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public to be 
reasonable and due diligence within the meaning of this act. 
0") The state engineer, in acting upon requests for extension of time, 
may, if he finds unjustified delay or lack of diligence in prosecuting the 
works to completion, deny the extension or may grant the request in part 
or upon conditions, including a reduction of the priority of all or part of 
the application. 
(2) (a) An application upon which proof has not been submitted shall lapse 
and have no further force or effect after the expiration of 50 years from 
the date of its approval. 
(b) If the works are constructed with which to make beneficial use of 
the water applied for, the state engineer may, upon showing of that fact, 
grant additional time beyond the 50-year period in which to make proof. 
(A-7) 
73-3-3. Permanent or temporary changes in point of diver-
sion or purpose of use. 
(1) For purposes of this section: ,
 f 
(a) "Permanent changes" means changes for an indefinite length of 
time with an intent to relinquish the original point of diversion, place, or 
PT)°"Te0mpUoSreary changes" means all changes for definitely fixed periods 
not exceeding one year. 
(2) (a) Any person entitled to the use of water may make 
U) W Any P ^ ^ ^ ^
 temporary c h a n g e s i n the place of diversion, 
(ii) permanent or temporary changes in the place of use; and 
(iii) permanent or temporary changes in the purpose of use for 
which the water was originally appropriated ...
 n n t i l i q t 
(b) No change may be made if it impairs any vested right without just 
o ' T o t h ^ a n e n t and temporary changes of point of diversion place or 
purpose of use of water, including water involved in general adjudication or 
other suits, shall be made in the manner provided in this ^ ^ 
(4) (a) No change may be made unless the change application is approved 
% ? l f P t a S o ? s n S a l l be made upon forms furnished by the state engi-
neer and shall set forth: 
(i) the name of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right; 
(iii) the quantity of water; 
(iv) the stream or source; A^r+*A-
(v) the point on the stream or source where the water is divert^, 
(vi) the point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the 
water; 
(vii) the place, purpose, and extent of the present use; 
(viii) the place, purpose, and extent of the proposed use; and 
(ix) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(5) (a) The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the rights 
and duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent 
changes of point of diversion, place, or purpose of use shall be the same, as 
provided in this title for applications to appropriate water. 
(b) The state engineer may, in connection with applications for perma-
nent change involving only a change in point of diversion of 660 feet or 
less, waive the necessity for publishing a notice of application. 
(6) (a) The state engineer shall investigate all temporary change applica-
tions. 
(b) If the state engineer finds that the temporary change will not im-
pair any vested rights of others, he shall issue an order authorizing the 
change. 
(c) If the state engineer finds that the change sought might impair 
vested rights, before authorizing the change, he shall give notice of the 
application to all persons whose rights might be affected by the change. 
(d) Before making an investigation or giving notice, the state engineer 
may require the applicant to deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the 
expenses of the investigation and publication of notice. 
(7) (a) The state engineer may not reject applications for either permanent 
or temporary changes for the sole reason that the change would impair 
the vested rights of others. 
(b) If otherwise proper, permanent or temporary changes may be ap-
proved as to part of the water involved or upon the condition that conflict-
ing rights are acquired. 
(A-8) 
73-3-3 
(8) (a) Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of 
water may either permanently or temporarily change the point of diver-
sion, place, or purpose of use. 
(b) No change of an approved application affects the priority of the 
original application, except that no change of point of diversion, place, or 
nature of use set forth in an approved application will enlarge the time 
within which the construction of work is to begin or be completed. 
(9) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, 
place, or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily, without first 
applying to the state engineer in the manner provided in this section: 
(a) obtains no right; and 
(b) is guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of the unlawful change consti-
tuting a separate offense, separately punishable. 
(10) (a) The provisions of this section do not apply to the replacement of an 
existing well by a new well drilled within a radius of 150 feet from the 
point of diversion from the existing well. 
(b) No replacement well may be drilled except after complying with the 
requirements of Section 73-3-28. 
(11) (a) The Division of Wildlife Resources may file applications for perma-
nent or temporary changes according to the requirements of this section 
on: 
(i) perfected water rights presently owned by the Division of Wild-
life Resources; 
(ii) perfected water rights purchased by tha t division through 
funding provided for that purpose by legislative appropriation, or 
acquired by lease, agreement, gift, exchange, contribution; or 
(iii) appurtenant water rights acquired with the acquisition of real 
property for other wildlife purposes. 
(b) (i) Subsection (a) allows changes only be for the limited purpose of 
providing water for instream flows in natural channels necessary for 
the preservation or propagation of fish within a designated section of 
a natural stream channel. 
(ii) Subsection (11) does not allow enlargement of the water right 
sought to be changed nor may the change impair any vested water 
right. 
(c) In addition to the other requirements of this section, an application 
filed by the Division of Wildlife Resources shall: 
(i) set forth the points on the natural stream between which the 
necessary instream flows will be provided by the change; and 
(ii) include appropriate studies, reports, or other information re-
quired by the state engineer that demonstrate the necessity for the 
instream flows in the specified section of the na tura l stream, and the 
projected benefits to the public fishery tha t will result from the 
change. 
(d) (i) The Division of Wildlife Resources may not acquire title or a 
long-term interest in a water right for the purposes provided in Sub-
section (ll)(b) without prior legislative approval. 
(ii) After obtaining that approval, the Division of Wildlife Re-
sources may file a request for a permanent change as provided in 
Subsection (l l)(a). 
(e) Subsection (11) does not authorize the Division of Wildlife Re-
sources to: 
(i) appropriate unappropriated water under Section 73-3-2 for the 
purpose of providing instream flows; or 
(ii) acquire water rights by eminent domain for instream flows or 
for any other purpose. 
(f) Subsection (11) applies only to applications filed on or after April 28, 
1986. 
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